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Introduction
e speedy evolution of wireless technology has elevated Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) to higher levels and also made vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) more attractive from academia and industry [1] . VANETs, as a special application of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), are an important component of ITS, rapidly changing, and self-configuring and employ multiple-hops topologies on wireless links [2] .
A typical architecture of the VANETs is shown in Figure 1 . Usually, the VANETs system comprises four main components, i.e., the Trusted Authorities (TAs), the Application Servers (ASs), the Roadside Units (RSUs), and the vehicles, which is equipped with Onboard Units (OBUs).
e responsibility of TAs is to maintain the whole system. e work of ASs is to provide a further data analysis. e RSUs are along the roadside deployment, which serve as transfer stations or carry out the authentication works to lighten the burden of the TAs. e OBUs are embedded in the vehicles to collect and process the traffic-related information and communicate with other entities. e communications mode in VANETs can be classified into two basic types, i.e., Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication. In V2I communication, the vehicles communicate directly with the RSUs fixed in roadside. e vehicles communicate directly with each other to exchange the information in V2V communication. e vehicles (OBUs) communicate with the RUSs and other vehicles via a public wireless channel.
rough the wired channel, the RSUs also connect with TAs and ASs. In VANETs, utilizing Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) standard [3] , each vehicle periodically broadcasts the vehicle-related condition messages (e.g., speed, turning intention, direction, and position) and traffic-related safety messages (e.g., congestion state, traffic events, and weather) every 100-300 milliseconds (ms). One side, all the messages are forwarded to the traffic control center (AS) by the RSUs through wired connection. Based on the received messages, the management strategy and optimized control can be generated by the traffic control center to improve efficiency and traffic safety through analyzing the current traffic load in each intersection. On the other side, an early response can be made by the vehicles under the specific situations such as emergent braking, traffic jams, accidents, etc.
e appearing of VANETs stems from enhancing the safe driving conditions and road safety. As the traffic-related messages are transmitted in the wireless channel, the malicious attackers can easily eavesdrop, modify, replay, and delete the messages. Hence, for the practical applications of VANETs, the security and privacy challenges are needed to be tackled.
Facing all kinds of security attacks mentioned above, the message authentication is a crucial security problem for VANETs. In practice, the messages from the vehicle (OBU) need to be integrity-checked and authenticated before depended on. e reason is that an attacker can replace or modify the original safety messages or even impersonate a vehicle to broadcast bogus messages. e message authentication, which consists of identity authentication check and the message integrity check, is implemented to allow vehicle to differentiate trustworthy messages from broadcast messages and to resist impersonation attacks and modification attacks. e digital signature technology would be used to solve this problem in VANETs, which not only allows the receiver to identify the sender, but also prevents the message contents from being altered in transmission.
In addition, privacy is also a significant issue in VANETs. In real life, the vehicle-related privacy information like a vehicle's real identity should be hidden; otherwise, the moving patterns and location of the vehicle can be traced by the attacker. For instance, the leakage of vehicle's traveling routes information will disclose privacy of the vehicle and lead to serious consequences since the information may be utilized for crimes or traffic collisions. erefore, the vehicles' privacy must be ensured in VANETs. Nonetheless, sometimes there is a conflict between the security and the privacy. e former needs to know the message's origin and integrity, while the latter requires that no entity can trace a message to its generator. Hence, conditional privacy is usually considered in VANETs.
at is to say, vehicle's privacy is normally guaranteed, but if a malicious vehicle broadcasts fake messages and causes accidents or crimes, a legal authority will be capable to trace or retrieve the messages of vehicle through revealing the vehicle's real identity.
e conditional privacy-preserving authentication (CPPA) mechanism, which is able to achieve message authentication and conditional privacy simultaneously, is fully appropriate for solving the security and privacy issues in VANETs.
Several research works about privacy preserving authentication for VANETs have been proposed in recent years, which include public key infrastructure based (PKIbased) CPPA schemes [2, [4] [5] [6] , identity-based (ID-based) CPPA schemes from bilinear pairing [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] , binary authentication tree [20, 21] and elliptic curve [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] , and certificateless CPPA schemes [30, 31] . Although certificateless conditional privacy preserving authentication (CCPPA) schemes for VANETs [30, 31] solve the public key certification management problem in PKI-based CPPA schemes and the key escrow problem in ID-based CPPA schemes, the performance of [30, 31] is not efficient owing to the need of map-to-point hash and bilinear pairing operations. We know that these two operations are more complex, which means they need more time to execute than other operations. erefore, it is important for secure and practical VANETs to design a CCPPA scheme without mapto-point hash and bilinear pairing operations.
Based on certificateless cryptography [32] and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [33, 34] , an efficient CCPPA scheme for VANETs is proposed in this paper. e major contributions are as follows:
(i) An efficient CCPPA scheme for VANETs is proposed without employing map-to-point hash and bilinear pairing operations. e proposed scheme achieves the fast batch message verification. (ii) e security analysis shows that the proposed scheme is provably secure under the assumption of elliptic curve discrete logarithm in the random oracle model and satisfies all security and privacy requirements. (iii) e performances in computation delay and communication overhead are evaluated. e experimental simulations indicate that the proposed CCPPA scheme is more efficient than schemes in [30, 31] for VANETs. (iv) An extensive simulation is conducted, and the results demonstrate that the proposed CCPPA scheme has extremely low average message delay and average message loss ratio.
e remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a review of the previous related works. e system model, security requirements, and elliptic curve group are presented in Section 3. We propose a concrete CCPPA scheme for secure V2I communication in Section 4 and the security analysis for the proposed scheme in Section 5. Section 6 conducts the performance evaluation and experimental simulations of the proposed scheme with other schemes. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
Related Works
In VANETs, the security and privacy problems have attracted strong interest and research from industry and academia. Recently, lots of CPPA schemes for VANETs have been put forward and roughly classified into three categories:
PKI-based schemes, ID-based schemes, and certificateless schemes.
In 2004, Hubaux et al. [4] firstly pointed out the security and privacy issues in VANETs and declared that the public key infrastructure (PKI) technology could be used to protect transmitted messages in the vehicles. In 2007, based on anonymous certificates, an anonymous authentication scheme for VANETs was proposed by Raya and Hubaux [2] . ey showed that the proposed scheme can provide message authentication and conditional privacy preservation. In this scheme, each vehicle requires to preload a huge quantity of anonymous public/private key pairs and corresponding public key certificates and then to sign a message using one of the private keys for anonymity in each communication.
erefore, a huge storage space is needed to store keys and corresponding certificates in all vehicles, while the certificate authority also needs to store all vehicles' certificates. In 2008, Lu et al. [5] put forward an efficient conditional privacy preservation (ECPP) scheme for VANETs to solve the problem of a large storage space for the vehicles in [2] by employing the temporary anonymous certificates. Based on the hash message authentication code (HMAC) and k-anonymity approach, an efficient RSU-aided message authentication scheme was proposed by Zhang et al. [6] to realize the privacy preserving of the vehicles. In summary, all the PKI-based authentication schemes for VANETs have a bottleneck problem on the storage and management of certificates.
To tackle the problem mentioned above, identity-based (ID-based) authentication schemes for VANETs have been proposed. Based on the ID-based cryptography [35] , Zhang et al. [7, 8] proposed ID-based CPPA schemes. In their schemes, both the vehicle (OBU) and RSU use the identity information (such as license plate number, device number) as the public keys and the corresponding private keys are generated by a trusted third party, called the Private Key Generator (PKG). erefore, these schemes can eliminate the need for certificates storage in vehicles and RSUs. Also, the technology of batch message verification can be provided to realize the function of verifying large number of messages simultaneously. In 2011, Chim et al. [9] claimed that Zhang et al.'s schemes [7, 8] are vulnerable to the impersonation attack and antitraceability attack. Using the two shared secrets, Chim et al. [9] also proposed a communication scheme for VANETs. e new scheme not only satisfies the requirements of the security and privacy and but also has lower communication overhead. In 2012, based on the pseudo-identity-based signature, an ID-based CPPA scheme for VANETs was established in [10] which provided the batch message verification. In 2013, Lee and Lai [11] showed that scheme in [7] was insecure against repudiation and relay attacks. And, an improved ID-based privacy-preserving authentication scheme for VANETs was put forward to overcome the weaknesses in [7] and maintain the efficiency. Horng et al. [12] pointed out that scheme in [9] is vulnerable to impersonation attack and gave a new scheme to remedy the security flaw mentioned in [9] . In 2014, Liu et al. [13] indicated that the underlying Shim's identity-based signature scheme in [10] was insecure and thus the corresponding authentication mechanism suffers from modification attacks. An improved ID-based CPPA scheme was proposed in [14] to make up for the weaknesses in [11] and maintain the efficiency as scheme in [11] . In 2015, Bayat et al. [15] , aiming at the security flaw in [11] , proposed a new scheme. In 2016, exploring the ID-based signature with message recovery, Liu et al. [16] presented an efficient authentication scheme for VANETs that realized the anonymity of vehicles and batch message authentication. Based on bilinear pairing, a CPPA scheme for VANETs was proposed by Wang et al. [17] . is scheme is proven secure under the computational 
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Differ-Hellman (CDH) assumption in the random oracle model. Based on HMAC and identity based signature, an anonymous batch authentication protocol for VANETs was proposed by Jiang et al. [18] . In 2017, Tzeng et al. [19] found that the scheme in [11] was exposed to some security risks in VANETs and proposed a secure scheme in the random oracle model. In 2009, Jiang et al. [20] firstly presented an ID-based authentication algorithm for V2I communication using a binary authentication tree. is scheme achieves high efficiency when verifying many signatures and filtering bogus messages. However, Shim [21] claimed that Jiang et al.'s scheme in [20] was unable to resist replay, forgery and sybil attacks, and proposed an improved scheme using aggregate signature, ID-based signature, and binary authentication tree. In 2015, by utilizing the ECC, He et al. [22] firstly proposed an ID-based CPPA scheme for VANETs without using map-to-point hash as well as bilinear pairing operations. is scheme has better performances in terms of computation and communication costs. Based on BLS short signature [36] and ECC, Xie et al. [23, 24] put forward IDbased conditional privacy preserving authentication schemes for VANETs, respectively. ese schemes satisfy the security and privacy requirements in VANETs and achieve lower computation costs. For the secure communication and vehicle privacy in VANETs, Lo and Tsai [25] presented an efficient CPPA scheme, which does not need map-to-point hash and bilinear pairing operations to achieve better performances. Zhong et al. [26] proposed a provably secure CPPA scheme in the random oracle model which provides a practical service application for VANETs. In 2017, based on the ECC, Wu et al. [27] established an efficient locationbased CPPA protocol for VANETs without using the bilinear pairing and tamper-proof device, which could satisfy the security and privacy requirements. Exploiting the binary search and cuckoo filter techniques, Cui et al. [28] proposed a secure privacy-preserving authentication scheme with high success rate in batch verification. In 2018, Li et al. [29] put forward an efficient and anonymous CPPA scheme, which achieves an optimal performance in terms of computation and communication costs. In the aforementioned ID-based CPPA schemes, all the entities' private keys are generated by PKG, which eliminates the management and storage of certificates in PKI-based schemes. However, the schemes suffer from the inherent key escrow problem, i.e., PKG knows the private keys of all vehicles and RSUs and thus literally decrypts any ciphertexts and forges signatures on any messages as any entity. erefore, it seems that ID-based schemes may not suitable for VANETs.
To solve the key escrow problem of ID-based schemes as well as the certificate management problem in PKIbased schemes, Horng et al. [30] proposed a provable secure CCPPA scheme for VANETs based on the certificateless cryptography [32] . In CCPPA scheme, only the partial private key for the users (vehicles and RSUs) is generated by the trusted Key Generator Center (KGC). e user chooses a secret value itself and combines the partial private key to form the private key and hence KGC cannot obtain the private keys of the users. Note that the certificates are no longer required to guarantee the authenticity of public keys in CCPPA scheme. In 2016, Li et al. [31] pointed out that the scheme in [30] was insecure under the malicious-but-passive KGC attack, i.e., KGC can forge a signature or decrypt a ciphertext using maliciously embedded trapdoors in the public parameters. Furthermore, an improved scheme was put forward. In 2018, based on the new paradigm of certificateless signature with message signature (CLS-MR), Ming and Shen [37] proposed a CCPPA scheme for VANETs.
e advantage is that the scheme achieved better communication efficiency. e only imperfection is that the maximum message length was limited to k 2 , where k 2 is a positive integer such that k 2 less than a prime number p. In this paper, the certificateless signature technology is used to design an efficient CCPPA scheme, where the length of message is arbitrary size. Hence, this scheme is more suitable for practical VANETs system.
Preliminaries

System Model.
e system model of the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 2 . is model consists of two layers.
e lower layer comprises OBUs installed in the vehicles and RSUs along with roadsides. e communication between RSU and OBU is based on the DSRC protocol [3] .
e upper layer includes two trust authorities (TAs), i.e., Key Generator Center (KGC) and Trace Authority (TRA), and Application Servers (ASs) (data analysis center or traffic control center), where message exchange would be implemented over the secure channel provided by the transport layer security (TLS) protocol.
KGC. e KGC is assumed to be a trusted third party and has sufficient storage space and computing power. KGC is in charge of producing public system parameters and preloading them on RSUs and OBUs in the off-line mode. Furthermore, it also generates and distributes the partial private keys for RSUs and OBUs.
TRA. e TRA is assumed to be a trusted third party and has sufficient storage space and computing power. TRA is responsible for the registration of RSUs and OBUs. It can trace messages to their sources and reveal the real identities of the vehicles.
AS. e AS is a safety-related application server, like a trafficdata analysis center, or a traffic manage center. AS is working for first gathering the traffic-related messages including current location, time, and traffic accidents from RSUs and then making further analysis and/or providing feedbacks to them. e AS communicates with KGC, TRA, and RSUs via the wired channel.
RSU.
e RSU is located along the roadside with higher computation capabilities. It can communicate with OBU of the vehicle in their coverage region by a wireless channel and communicate with KGC, TRA, and AS via a secure wired channel. In VANETs, the RSU is assumed to be a fully trusted party and is used for verifying messages and processing them locally or sending them to TA or AS when received traffic-related messages.
OBU. e OBU is embedded in the vehicle to communicate with other OBUs and RSUs using Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) [3] technology recognized as IEEE 802.11p (5.9 GHz). It warns the driver about jams and to avoid road accidents through periodically broadcasting the traffic-related status messages like speed, direction, and position to other vehicles.
Security Requirements.
In V2I communication scenario, the following security requirements are needed to be satisfied in the proposed CCPPA scheme.
Message Authentication. e receiver should be able to verify the traffic-related messages and appended signatures in VANETs in order to preserve the integrity of messages sent by the vehicle.
Identity Privacy
Preserving. e real identity of each vehicle should be kept secret from other entities in VANETs. Any entity ought not break the vehicle's privacy and disclose the real identity of the vehicle by analyzing transmitted messages.
Traceability.
e TRA, as a trusted party must have the capability to expose the real identity of any malicious vehicle, which has broadcasted forged messages to other vehicles in order to disrupt the traffic.
Unlinkability. In addition to TRA, it is difficult to determine for anyone whether two messages are sent by the same vehicle.
Role Separation. Two trusted authorities TRA and KGC are involved in VANETs. TRA is in charge of constructing pseudo identities of the vehicle and if necessary, tracing the vehicle's real identity. KGC is for creating the vehicle's partial private key on the pseudo identity.
Key Escrow Resilience. In VANETs, KGC is normally a semitrusted commercial organization rather than fulltrusted and trustworthy entity. erefore, it is required that KGC cannot impersonate the legitimate vehicle and to generate a valid signature using the vehicle's private key.
Resistance to Attack. Apart from the conventional security and privacy requirements, the CCPPA scheme must be capable to resist various common attacks in the lower layer communication, for example, the impersonation attack, modification attack, replay attack, and man-in-the-middle attack.
Elliptic Curve Group.
e elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was initially introduced by Miller [33] and Koblitz [34] .
An elliptic curve E over a finite field F p , where p is a large prime, is defined by the following equation:
where (4a 3 + 27b 2 )mod p ≠ 0. An infinity point O and all points (x, y) ∈ E form an additive cyclic group G. Scalar multiplication over G is defines as
where P ∈ G. Elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDL) problem [22, 37] : given two random points P and Q on the elliptic curve E, find an integer x, such that Q � xP.
Elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDL) assumption [22, 37] : the ECDL assumption means that there are no know polynomial-time algorithms to solve the ECDL problem with non-negligible probability.
Elliptic curve computational Differ-Hellman (ECCDH) problem [22, 37] : given two random points R � xP and Q � yP on the elliptic curve E, where x, y are two unknown integers, compute the point xyP.
Elliptic curve computational Differ-Hellman (ECCDH) assumption [22, 37] : the ECCDH assumption means that there are no know polynomial-time algorithms to solve the ECCDH problem with non-negligible probability.
The Proposed Scheme
is section describes a CCPPA scheme for V2I communication. e proposed CCPPA scheme includes the following four phases: system initialization, pseudo identity generation and partial private key extraction, private key generation and message signing, and message verification.
e definition of notations used in the present paper is listed in Table 1 .
System Initialization.
is phase is executed by the two TAs (KGC and TRA) to generate system parameters for all RSUs and OBUs. e following steps are performed in this phase:
(1) e TAs randomly choose two large prime numbers p and q. en TAs select a non-singular elliptic curve E defined by the equation
(2) e TAs pick a group G of elliptic curve points with prime order q and a generator P of G. (3) e KGC randomly chooses s ∈ Z * q as the master key for partial private key extraction and computes P pub � sP. (4) e TRA randomly selects t ∈ Z * q as the master key for identity traceability and computes T pub � tP. (5) e TAs choose four one-way hash functions:
q . e TAs publish params � p, q, G, P, P pub , T pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 } as the public system parameters and send them to all RSUs and vehicles (OBUs). e master keys s and t are kept secretly by KGC and TRA, respectively. Here, the system parameters params are preloaded into the tamper-proof devices (TPD) of all vehicles in VANETs.
Pseudo Identity Generation and Partial Private Key Extraction.
is phase is executed between the vehicles and the TAs (TRA, KGC). e TRA calculates the pseudo identities for the vehicle V i , and then the KGC generates the partial private keys corresponding to the pseudo identities, when TRA receiving the real identity RID i from V i , where RID i uniquely identifies the vehicle V i . Based on this fact, the TRA and KGC preload the pseudo identities and partial private keys in TPD of vehicle V i after successful completion of own offline registration.
e following steps are executed in this phase:
(1) e vehicle V i transmits the real identity RID i to the TRA in a secure manner. (2) After confirming the real identity RID i , the TRA randomly chooses w i ∈ Z * q and computes
where T i defines the valid period of this pseudo identity. en, a pseudo identity PID i � PID i,1 , PID i,2 , T i is delivered to the KGC in a secure channel. 
e KGC sends the pseudo identity and partial private key PID i , D i , k i to the vehicle V i .
Private Key Generation and Message Signing.
At the private key generation and message signing phase, the vehicle V i generates private key and signs messages. en, the vehicle V i broadcasts a message including the pseudo identity, trafficrelated message and signature, public key, and timestamp, to nearby RUSs. is phase is depicted as follows:
(1) e vehicle V i randomly picks x i ∈ Z * q and sets x i as the secret value and computes P i � x i P. en, the vehicle V i 's private key is D i , k i , x i and the public key is P i . (2) e vehicle V i randomly chooses a pseudo identity PID i from its storage and a current timestamp t i , which supports the freshness of message so as to resist the replay attack. Given a traffic-related message M i , the vehicle V i randomly selects r i ∈ Z * q and computes 
Four one-way hash functions, 
Message Verification.
e verifier (RSU) performs a validity check on the received traffic-related messages in this phase, who can verify the correctness of the signature to ensure that the corresponding vehicle is not attempting to impersonate any other legitimate vehicles or disseminate false messages.
e single message verification and batch message verification are as follows, respectively.
Single Message Verification.
e verifier receives the message M i , PID i , t i , P i , D i , R i , σ i } to verify the validity of the message by the performing the following steps:
(1) e verifier checks whether T i is valid and t i is fresh.
If T i is not valid or t i is not fresh, the message will be dropped. (2) e verifier checks whether the equation
holds or not. If it holds, accept the message.
Batch Message Verification.
e batch message verification can be used to verify multiple messages simultaneously in order to enhance the efficiency of verification. When receiving the distinct n messages M 1 , PID 1 , t 1 
. . , M n , PID n , t n , P n , D n , R n , σ n } generated by the different vehicles, respectively, the verifier checks the validity of the messages as follows:
(1) e verifier checks whether T i is valid and t i is fresh, where i � 1, 2, . . . , n. If any T i is not valid or t i is not fresh, the messages will be dropped. (2) e verifier checks whether the equation
holds or not. If it holds, accept the messages.
To detect any invalid signature in batch message verification of n messages, we use the small exponent test technology [14, 16] to realize batch message verification. e verifier checks whether the following equation
holds or not. If it holds, accept the messages, where
and l is a small integer.
Security Proof and Analysis
In this section, the security analysis of the proposed CCPPA scheme for VANETs is provided. We describe the security model and prove the security of the proposed scheme under the random oracle model. en, an evaluation on the security requirements of the proposed scheme as well as its comparison with other schemes in [22, 25, 27, 30, 31] is conducted. Proof. Assuming that polynomially bounded Type I adversary A 1 , who can break our proposed scheme with probability ε in time t, there exists an algorithm B that can compute x with a non-negligible probability when receiving a random ECDL problem instance P, xP � Q { }. e algorithm B runs A 1 as subroutine and acts as the challenger C in Game 1 and interacts with A 1 as described below.
Initialization. e algorithm B sets P pub � Q and sends system parameters params � p, q, G, P, P pub , T pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 } to A 1 . Here, hash functions H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 are considered as random oracles in the proof.
To keep the consistency and rapidly response, B maintains the initially empty lists as follows:
is list consists of tuples , and executes as follows:
, and executes as follows: 
Following equations (9) and (10), we can obtain
, which is the solution to the ECDL problem.
After completing the above simulation, we will analyze the probability and time of B to solve the ECDL problem instance.
Assuming that A 1 can make at most q H i times H i (i � 1, 2, 3, 4) queries, q cv times create vehicle queries, q pp times partial private key queries, q sv times secret value queries, q vp times vehicle public key replacement queries, and q s times sign queries. e probability of failure in handling a partial private key query resulted from a conflict on H 2 is at most q H 2 q pp /q. e probability of failure in handling a sign query caused by a conflict on H 4 is at most q s (q H 4 + q s )/q. In addition, the probability of A 1 outputs a valid forgery without asking the corresponding H 2 , H 3 , H 4 is at most 3/q. B guesses it correctly as the point of rewind, with probability at least 1/q H 2 .
erefore, the probability of success of B to solve the ECDL problem is at least
e running time of B is equal to the running time of A 1 plus the time it takes to respond to q cv create vehicle queries, q pp partial private key queries, q sv secret value queries, and q s sign queries. Each create vehicle query requires 1 scale multiplication operation in G. Each partial private key query requires 2 scale multiplication operations in G. Each secret value query requires 1 scale multiplication operation in G. Each sign query requires 2 scale multiplication operations in G. Assuming that each scale multiplication in G needs time t sm , the total running time of B is at most t + (2q pp + q cv + q sv + 2q s )t sm .
□ Lemma 2.
e proposed CCPPA scheme for VANETs is existential unforgeable against Type II adversary A 2 under the ECDL assumption in the random oracle model.
Proof. Assuming that a polynomially bounded Type II adversary A 2 , who can break our proposed scheme with probability ε in time t, there exists an algorithm B that can compute x with a non-negligible probability when receiving a random ECDL problem instance P, xP � Q { }. e algorithm B runs A 2 as subroutine and acts as the challenger C in Game 2 and interacts with A 2 as described below:
Initialization. e algorithm B randomly chooses θ ∈ Z q and sets θP � P pub , then B sends master key θ and system parameters params � p, q, G, P, P pub , T pub , H 1 by replaying process with the same random tape but a different choice of H 3 . en we have (12) and (13), we have
Finally, B outputs (
Same to Lemma 1, the analysis on the probability and time of B is as follows.
Assuming that A 2 can make at most q H i times H i (i � 1, 2, 3, 4) queries, q cv times create vehicle queries, q sv times secret value queries, and q s times sign queries. e probability of failure in handing a sign query because of a conflict on H 4 is at most q s (q H 4 + q s )/q. In a secret value query and forgery phase, the probability of success is (1 − δ) q sv δ according to Coron's technique [43] . When the optimal probability is δ � 1/(q sv + 1), it is greater than 1/e(q sv + 1). e probability of A 2 outputs a valid forgery signature without asking the corresponding H 2 or H 3 or H 4 is at most 3/q. B guesses it correctly as the point of rewind, with probability at least 1/q H 3 . erefore, the probability of success of B to solve the ECDL problem is at least
e running time of B is equal to the running time of A 2 plus the time it takes to respond to q cv create vehicle queries, q sv secret value queries, and q s sign queries. Each create vehicle query requires 1 scale multiplication operation in G. Each secret value query requires 1 scale multiplication operation in G. Each sign query requires 2 scale multiplication operations in G. Assuming that each scale multiplication in G needs time t sm , the total running time of B is at most t + (q cv + q sv + 2q s )t sm .
□
Analysis and Comparison of Security Requirements.
An evaluation on the security of the proposed scheme as well as its comparison with other schemes is conducted in this subsection.
Message Authentication. As eorem 1, any polynomialtime adversary cannot be able to forge a valid signature due to the assumption that the ECDL problem is hard. By verifying whether equation (6) 
However, without knowing w i and t, it is impossible for any adversary to obtain RID i because it is an instance of ECCDH problem to solve w i · t · P. Hence, any adversary is not able to obtain the real identity RID i of the vehicle, even if he/or she knows the pseudo identity PID i . erefore, the identity preserving can be ensured in the proposed CCPPA scheme.
Traceability. e real identity RID i of the vehicle V i is involved in a pseudo identity PID i , where
, the TRA can extract the real identity RID i using its own master key t.
erefore, the proposed CCPPA scheme satisfies the traceability.
Unlinkability. In the proposed scheme, the TRA, KGC, and the vehicle randomly select w i ∈ Z * q , d i ∈ Z * q and r i ∈ Z * q , respectively, and generate a message M i ,
Owning to the randomness of w i , d i , and r i , any adversary is unable to link two messages sent from the same vehicle or two anonymous pseudo identities. erefore, the proposed CCPPA scheme realizes the unlinkability.
Role Separation. ere are two trusted authorities, namely, KGC and TRA, in the proposed scheme. e real identity of a vehicle can be only revealed by TRA, even if KGC cannot have the capability to do this. Here, t must be strongly protected in order to achieve the vehicle's anonymous, in which the threshold cryptography [44] would be a better candidate. But, the master key s of KGC should not be strongly protected, because no adversaries can generate a valid message under only knowing s without the vehicle's secret value.
Key Escrow Resilience. In the proposed scheme, the private key of the vehicle V i includes the secret value x i and partial private key D i , k i , where the vehicle V i calculates the secret value x i itself, and it cannot be accessed by the KGC. Hence, the malicious KGC cannot impersonate a vehicle to generate a valid signature without knowing the secret value x i . e key escrow resilience is satisfied in the proposed CCPPA scheme.
Resistance to Attacks.
e proposed CCPPA scheme can resist the main security attacks of VANETs as follows: (6) . However, according to eorem 1, the probability of the forged message for the adversary to satisfy equation (6) can be negligible. (iv) Man-in-the-middle attack. Based on the aforementioned analysis for message authentication and modification attack, any modification about message in transmitting can be found by verifying equation (6). Table 2 shows the security comparisons of the proposed scheme with related schemes in [22, 25, 27, 30, 31] , in which ✔ indicates "satisfy" and ✘ means "not satisfy".
According to Table 2 , He et al.'s scheme [22] , Lo and Tsai's scheme [25] , and Wu et al.'s scheme [27] cannot provide key escrow resilience, i.e., the vehicles' private key is entirely generated by the KGC, and it is not fully trusted, it can impersonate any legal vehicle whenever it wants. is may be a strong assumption in VANETs that the KGC is fully trusted for solving key escrow problem. In addition, Horng et al.'s scheme [30] cannot achieve message authentication and resist modification attack, impersonation attack and man-in-the-middle attack. In contrast, the proposed scheme can satisfy all security requirements. erefore, the proposed scheme has better security than the schemes in [22, 25, 27, 30] .
Performance Evaluation and Simulation
In this section, the computation delay and communication overhead of the proposed CCPPA scheme are compared with the identity-based CPPA schemes [22, 25, 27] and the certificateless CCPPA schemes [30, 31] . In addition, an extensive simulation is performed using ns-3.26 simulator [45] and the simulation of urban mobility (SUMO) [46] . e ns-3.26 simulator is used for wireless network simulation and SUMO, a traffic simulation tool, provides the realistic traffic mobility model. e simulations are evaluating the average message delay and average message loss ratio in real scenario.
Computation Delay.
e computation delay for the message signing and message verification is evaluated. For computation complexity estimation, the time cost for performing the cryptographic operations is defined below. Let T p be the time for performing a bilinear pairing operation, T mtp be the time for performing a map-to-point hash function operation. e time for performing a scale multiplication operation in bilinear pairing and ECC are denoted as T m and T m−ecc , respectively. Because the v i used in batch verification is very small, the computation cost can be negligible. Other lightweight operations (one-way hash function and point addition) are not taken into account.
In terms of the proposed CCPPA scheme, He et al.'s scheme [22] , Lo and Tsai's scheme [25] , and Wu et al.'s scheme [27] , the ECC for the security level of 80 bits can be established as follows: G is an additive group generated by a point P on a non-singular elliptic curve E : y 2 � x 3 + ax + bmodp, the order of it is q, where a � −3, b is a random 160-bit prime number and p and q are two 160-bit prime numbers. For the CCPPA schemes in [30, 31] , the symmetric bilinear pairing for the security level of 80 bits can be constructed as follows: e : G 1 × G 1 ⟶ G T , where G 1 is an additive group formed by a generator P with the order q on a super singular elliptic curve E : y 2 � x 3 + xmodp with embedding degree 2. p is 512-bit prime number, and q is 160-bit Solinas prime number, which satisfy q · 12 · r � p + 1.
To quantify the running time of the cryptographic operations, the MIRACL Crypto SDK [47] is used in this paper.
e experiment is performed on Intel Corei5-4590, 3.3 GHz CPU, 8 gigabytes memory with Windows 7.
e average execution times of T p , T mtp , T m , and T m−ecc are listed in Table 3 .
Based on the experiment results, the computation delay of the proposed CCPPA scheme, He et al.'s scheme [22] , Lo and Tsai's scheme [25] , Wu et al.'s scheme [27] , Horng et al.'s scheme [30] , and Li et al.'s scheme [31] are summarized and shown in Table 4 .
In terms of the computation delay of one message signing, He et al.'s scheme [22] , Lo and Tsai's scheme [25] , and Wu et al.'s scheme [27] require two scalar multiplication operations in ECC.
erefore, the total signing time is 2T m−ecc � 1.6620 ms. Horng et al.'s scheme [30] requires two scalar multiplication operations in bilinear pairing. erefore, the total signing time is 2T m � 7.5540 ms. Li et al.'s scheme [31] requires two scalar multiplication operations in bilinear pairing and one map-to-point hash operation. erefore, the total signing time is 2T m + T mtp � 17.2592 ms. e proposed scheme requires three scalar multiplication operations in ECC.
erefore, the total signing time is 3T m−ecc � 2.4930 ms.
In terms of the computation delay of one message verification, He et al.'s scheme [22] and Lo and Tsai's scheme [25] require three scalar multiplication operations in ECC.
erefore, the total verification time is 3T m−ecc � 2.4930 ms. Wu et al.'s scheme [27] requires four scalar multiplication operations in ECC. erefore, the total verification time is 4T m−ecc � 3.3240 ms. Horng et al.'s scheme [30] requires three bilinear pairing operations, one scalar multiplication operation in bilinear pairing and one map-to-point hash operation. erefore, the total verification time is 3T p + T m + T mtp � 40.7195 ms. Li et al.'s scheme [31] requires three bilinear pairing operations, one scalar multiplication operation in bilinear pairing, and two map-to-point hash operations. erefore, the total verification time is 3T p + T m + 2T mtp � 50.4247 ms. e proposed scheme requires four scalar multiplication operations in ECC. erefore, the total verification time is 4T m−ecc � 3.3240 ms.
e computation delay for one message and its correlation with the number of messages (n) are shown in Figure 3 . It is known from Table 4 and Figure 3(a) , the computation delay of a message signing is 2.4930 ms in the proposed scheme, which decreases by 66.9% and 85.5% compared with those in Horng et al.'s scheme [30] and Li et al.'s scheme [31] , respectively. In terms of computation delay of a message verification, the proposed scheme needs 3.3240 ms, which decreases by 91.8% and 93.4% compared with those in Horng et al.'s scheme [30] and Li et al.'s scheme [31] , respectively.
To obtain computation delay of multiple (n) messages signing, the computation delay of one message signing should be repeated n times. erefore, the total n messages signing times in the proposed scheme, He et al.'s scheme [22] , Lo and Tsai's scheme [25] , Wu et al.'s scheme [27] , Horng et al.'s scheme [30] , and Li et al.'s scheme [31] are 2.4930n ms, 1.6620n ms, 1.6620n ms, 1.6620n ms, 7.5540n ms, and 17.2592n ms, respectively. To obtain the computation delay of multiple (n) messages verification, He et al.'s scheme [22] and Lo and Tsai's scheme [25] require (n + 2) scalar multiplication operations in ECC. erefore, the total verification time is (n + 2)T m−ecc � 0.8310n + 1.6620 ms. Wu et al.'s scheme [27] requires (2n + 2) scalar multiplication operations in ECC.
erefore, the total 
verification time is (2n + 2)T m−ecc � 1.6620n + 1.6620 ms. Horng et al.'s scheme [30] requires three bilinear pairing operations, n scalar multiplication operations in bilinear pairing, and n map-to-point hash operations. erefore, the total verification time is 3T p + nT m + nT mtp � 13.4822n + 27.2373 ms. Li et al.'s scheme [31] requires three bilinear pairing operations, n scalar multiplication operations in bilinear pairing, and (n + 1) map-to-point hash operations. erefore, the total verification time is 3T p + nT m + (n + 1)T mtp � 13.4822n + 36.9425 ms. e proposed scheme requires (2n + 2) scalar multiplication operations in ECC.
erefore, the total verification time is (2n + 2)T m−ecc � 1.6620n + 1.6620 ms.
As is shown in Figure 3 (b) and Figure 3(c) , that with the increase of number of messages, the signing delay and verification delay grows linearly in all schemes. And the proposed scheme has the lowest slope compared with schemes [30, 31] . It is shown in Figure 3(c) , the verification delay of the schemes in [22, 25, 27, 30] and [31] and the proposed scheme, respectively, is 9.9720 ms, 9.9720 ms, 18.2820 ms, 162.0593 ms, 171.7645 ms, and 18.2820 ms when n � 10, and 51.5520 ms, 51.5520 ms, 101.3830 ms, 836.1693 ms, 845.8745 ms, and 101.3830 ms when n � 60. Apparently, the proposed scheme achieves the lowest verification delay as the number of messages grows in all CCPPA schemes. erefore, the proposed scheme has much more superiority than other CCPPA schemes in [30, 31] in the signing and verification process, regardless of the number of messages, and is more suitable for VANETs.
e proposed CCPPA scheme is slightly less efficient than He et al.'s scheme [22] , Lo and Tsai's scheme [25] , and Wu et al.'s scheme [27] . is degradation is forgivable due to the fact that the proposed scheme is a certificateless system and provides key escrow resilience, however, is not the case in [22, 25, 27] .
Communication Cost.
In this subsection, the proposed scheme is compared with He et al.'s scheme [22] , Lo and Tsai's scheme [25] , Wu et al.'s scheme [27] , Horng et al.'s scheme [30] , and Li et al.'s scheme [31] in terms of the communication cost. In V2I communication, the communication cost refers to the size of message transmitted from a vehicle (OBU) to an RSU. Just as the before analysis, the length of p is 512 bits (64 bytes) and that of q is 160 bits (20 bytes), so the length of elements in G 1 and G, respectively, are 64 bytes and 20 bytes. Assuming the length of output of general one-way hash function is 160 bits (20 bytes) , and the length of a timestamp is 32 bits (4 bytes). According to the IEEE Trial-Use standard [48] for VANET security, the length of message is defined as 67 bytes. Table 5 illustrates the comparison of communication costs.
In He et al.'s scheme [22] , the message M i , PID i , t i , R i , σ i is sent from the vehicle to a RSU, where 
In the proposed scheme, the message M i , PID i , t i , P i , D i , R i , σ i } is sent from the vehicle to a RSU, where PID i is the same one as [22] . us, the communication cost of the proposed scheme is 195 bytes as
e comparison on the communication costs of one message and multiple messages is shown in Figure 4 . Clearly, the communication costs increase linearly as the number of messages increases in six schemes.
e same communication costs exist in the ID-based schemes [25, 27] Scheme A message signing A message verification n message signing n message batch verification [22] 2T m−ecc � 1.6620 ms 3T m−ecc � 2.4930 ms 2nT m−ecc � 1.6620n ms (n + 2)T m−ecc � 0.8310n + 1.6620 ms [25] 2T m−ecc � 1.6620 ms 3T m−ecc � 2.4930 ms 2nT m−ecc � 1.6620n ms (n + 2)T m−ecc � 0.8310n + 1.6620 ms [27] 2T m−ecc � certificateless schemes [30, 31] , whether one message or multiple messages are transmitted. e communication cost of the proposed scheme is the lowest in the CCPPA schemes, which significantly decreases by 44.44%. When the number of messages rises to 30 000, the proposed scheme can save 4.46 MB of bandwidth compared with the schemes in [30, 31] . e communication cost of the proposed scheme is slightly larger than that of He et al.'s scheme [22] , Lo and Tsai's scheme [25] , and Wu et al.'s scheme [27] . e reason is that the proposed scheme is a certificatless scheme, in which an additional user's public key is needed to transmit.
and the
Simulations.
e popular network simulator ns-3.26 [45] on a Ubuntu platform is adopted to evaluate the performances of the proposed CCPPA scheme by comparing with those of He et al.'s scheme [22] [31] . In addition, a road traffic simulator SUMO [46] is used to generate a realistic traffic mobility trace for the road scenario shown in Figure 5 .
In our road scenario, the RSUs are assigned every 500 m along each road, and each vehicle broadcasts traffic-related messages every 300 ms. e vehicles are distributed at random on the road and move toward randomly selected intersections.
e important simulation parameters are summarized in Table 6 .
Generally, the average message delay (avgMD) and average message loss ratio (avgMLR) in RSUs are adopted to estimate the performances. e avgMD is defined as
where N V and N R indicates the number of vehicles and RSUs in simulation area, respectively. e avgMLR refers to the ratio of the number of messages dropped over the total number of messages received by the RSUs, which is defined as
where N j Dropped indicates the number of messages dropped by R j (a RSU) in the application layer and N j Received represents the number of messages received by R j (a RSU) in MAC layer. We emphasize that the avgMLR occurs by the security protocol and the buffer space of the RSU, rather than the wireless transmission channel. [31] , and the proposed scheme, respectively. Clearly, the avgMD of the proposed scheme and schemes in [22, 25, 27] is very low and hardly affected by vehicle density. [31] and reaches as high as 57% when the number of vehicles is 100. However, for the proposed scheme and schemes in [22, 25, 27] , the avgMLR remains nearly 0 regardless of the vehicle density.
Impact of Vehicle Speed.
Two experiments are conducted to evaluate the impact of speed of vehicles on avgMD and avgMLR. e average vehicle speed is varies from 10 to 50 m/s (36 to 180 km/h) and the number of vehicles is 50.
e results obtained from the simulation under varying speed of vehicles are depicted in Figure 7 . Figure 7 (a) shows the relationship between avgMD and the speed of vehicles. Obviously, when the vehicle density is constant, the avgMD hardly changes, showing that it is merely little influenced by the speed of vehicles. Figure 7 (b) depicts the relationship between avgMLR and the speed of vehicles. When the speed of vehicles is higher than 20 m/s, the avgMLRs in Horng et al.'s scheme [30] and Li et al.'s scheme [31] are slightly influenced. As speed of vehicles gets larger, the avgMLR of the proposed scheme and schemes in [22, 25, 27] has been steady at a very low level. 
Scheme
Send a message Send n messages [22] 155 bytes 155n bytes [25] 175 bytes 175n bytes [27] 175 bytes 175n bytes [30] 351 bytes 351n bytes [31] 351 bytes 351n bytes e proposed scheme 195 bytes 195n bytes
Conclusion
is paper has presented a novel and efficient CCPPA scheme in V2I communication for VANETs. Our proposed scheme is not only provably secure in the random oracle model under the ECDL assumption, but also satisfies all security requirements such as message authentication and conditional privacy preserving. Furthermore, the proposed scheme does not need any map-to-point hash operations and bilinear pairing operations. e performance evaluation demonstrates that the proposed scheme has higher efficient 
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